![]() The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. ![]() Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. If this battle over Izium turns in Ukraine’s favor, the government in Ukraine could owe the victory to a bunch of former taxi drivers and teachers riding in second-line tanks.This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”-the term itself makes little sense-but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. “It appears that the Russians have over-stretched themselves over supply lines that they can’t defend,” Martin tweeted. Mike Martin, a fellow at the Department of War Studies at King's College London, said the Ukrainian attack has a high chance of succeeding. The attack, which began around Sunday, seems to represent an effort on the part of the Ukrainians to surround the Russian forces occupying nearby Izium and, in the process, cut off the main Russian supply lines through northeast Ukraine to the south. More recently, the 3rd Tank Brigade may have joined a Ukrainian assault east from besieged Kharkiv. The T-80 is based on the T-64 it’s possible the Ukrainians could repair and reuse the abandoned tanks. 3rd Tank Brigade scouts riding in BMP-1s walked in artillery fire on a Russian T-80 tank unit, destroying or forcing crews to abandon four of them. ![]() The unit’s first contact with the Russians seems to have come on or before April 2 in eastern Ukraine. In the weeks following the Russian invasion, the brigade took in new equipment: medical supplies in late March, body armor in mid-April. The 3rd Tank Brigade spent late winter training its reservists-businesspeople, teachers and taxi drivers, according to the unit-on their tanks, BMP-1s and BM-21 rocket launchers. War, and the destruction of scores of the best T-64s, compelled Kyiv to mobilize the T-72 formations. Some of the T-72s got a few minor tweaks at a factory in Kyiv, emerging as T-72AMTs. It’s not for no reason the Ukrainians assigned their 700 T-64s to active brigades and mostly held T-72s-as many as 500 of them-in reserve. The Soviet army in the late 1960s pivoted from the T-64 to the cheaper T-72 in order to simplify and maximize production, not because the latter was better.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |